Stuxnet, a complex worm discovered in 2010, targeted Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used in industrial facilities. By exploiting multiple vulnerabilities, including zero-days, it breached air-gapped networks (isolated systems) and disrupted Iranian nuclear centrifuges controlled by Siemens Step7 software.  It exposed the limitations of traditional security and highlighted the evolving cyber threat landscape, forcing a reevaluation of cybersecurity strategies and serving as a case study for the challenges of defending critical infrastructure in the digital age, where interconnected systems are vulnerable to sophisticated cyberattacks.   Stuxnet, a sophisticated computer worm, targeted Siemens Step7 software used in industrial control systems, particularly those controlling uranium enrichment centrifuges, and by exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities, it infiltrated air-gapped networks and manipulated programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to increase centrifuge speed, causing them to malfunction and damage Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.    This highly modular worm’s ability to adapt and its rootkit capabilities to hide its presence underscored the need for robust cybersecurity practices to protect critical infrastructure from cyberattacks.  It targeted Iranian nuclear centrifuges with zero-day exploits and manipulated Siemens industrial control systems, suggesting nation-state involvement and possibly a collaboration between US and Israeli intelligence agencies (codename:

Source: GBHackers